



Third Reich Study Group Bulletin

April 2026, Volume LXI, Number 2, (#239)

Special Double Issue!

Operation Barbarossa- The Invasion of Russia Explained

Inside:

- Phil Rhoads with the best Heydrich stamp exhibit you will ever see!
- Clark Lee shows us the Death Mask and Azad Hind in the news
- German Eastern Front occupation stamps: A two-part Panorama
- Auctionwatch! It's a buyer's market
- Tough Trivia – See if you can get half of them!
- Danzig
- And even more!

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April 2026, Volume LXI, Number 2, (#239)

Our Double Issue includes:

- **Barbarossa Explained-** This three-part series chronicles the preparation, implementation, and failure of the largest invasion in human history and what went wrong, sowing the seeds of defeat for Nazi Germany
- **German occupation stamps of the Eastern Front** – As Germany conquered territory, some territories began immediately changing their stamps. We take a detailed look at this two-part series.
- **The Heydrich Death Mask** – Phil Roade shows us his research and collection – simply the finest presentation of this material you will ever see!
- **Clark Lee** shows us the Heydrich death mask stamp, and the Azad Hind stamps continue to make philatelic news today
- **Our New Book!** – And don't forget to buy our new book on Amazon!
- **Plus, Trivia, AuctionWatch, and Danzig!**

Help! I strive to keep this website and journal free and accessible for everyone. I do not want to begin charging dues or putting up passwords and firewalls on this website. Philately should be for everyone! However, I could use a few dollars to cover expenses. You can support us by donating through PayPal on our website or by sending a check made out to Chris Kolker to 25 Parkwoods Drive, Norwich, CT 06360. Thank you for your continued support. You are what makes our study group great!

We invite submissions of all article types, including long and short pieces, as well as introductory material and expert contributions. We need them all! Please email your articles, scans, or ideas to kolkermd@att.net.

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To Our Esteemed Readers:

Once more, this issue is different than previous issues. This is our first **double** issue, in which we take the time to explore in depth the largest invasion in human history. The 1941 German invasion of Russia, Operation Barbarossa, set in motion Nazi Germany's defeat, and we give you a detailed look at what happened and why.

I hope you all will make plans to join me at the World Stamp Expo in Boston this May 23-30. On Tuesday, May 26th, we will have a meeting there with a special presentation by me on all things related to World War II stamps. I will be making a presentation on Fakes and Forgeries during the Second World War on Friday, May 29th at 1 PM. And on Tuesday, May 26th, we will have a meeting with a special presentation by me about all things in World War II stamps.

And please remember that while I don't charge for this, I do need a bit of financial assistance. Think about a small donation- just click on the "Donate Now" button at <http://www.trsg-usa.com> to get that done.

One more thing: my book, *Collecting Third Reich Material: A Systematic Review*, is out on Amazon and Barnes & Noble.

Buy the book!!! I put my heart and soul into it, so just hit "Control" and click [here](#) to be taken to Amazon, where you can get a comprehensive overview of Third Reich Philately for just a few dollars.

So, relax and enjoy the best that philately has to offer. I hope to see you all in May in Boston!

Your Editor,

Chris

Barbarossa

Part I – The Planning

It's June 1940, a bleak and tumultuous period in human history. Within just a few weeks, France has been conquered, succumbing to the relentless and aggressive advances of Nazi forces. The nation, once proud and powerful, now lies shattered and under occupation, casting a pall of despair as the world watches with bated breath and wonders, "What's next?" The previous year saw Poland fall under Nazi control, and now, across the European continent, the swastika's shadow looms large, symbolizing the devastating reach of the Nazi regime.

However, no matter the efforts, they always seemed insufficient. Driven by an insatiable desire for global dominance, Hitler, as early as July 21st, 1940, confided in his inner circle his thoughts of launching an attack against the Soviet Union.


His memo:

German assembly will take at least four to six weeks. Object: to crush the Russian Army, or slice as much Russian territory as is necessary to bar enemy air raids on Berlin and the Silesian industries. It is desirable to penetrate far enough to enable our Air Force to smash Russia's strategic areas....Political aims: Ukrainian State, Federation of Baltic States, White Russia – Finland...Strength required: 80 to 100 divisions; Russia has 50 to 75 divisions.

Why would he undertake such a surprising action? He implied that it was a strategic defensive measure. He was aware of meetings between the Soviet Union and Great Britain, where they discussed efforts to strengthen their defenses against Germany. Hitler believed that forming a unified alliance could become a formidable force on the geopolitical stage.

Most officials within the inner circle of the Nazi regime believed that the Soviet Union posed little threat to Germany. Despite this, they still maintained a certain level of respect for Great Britain, recognizing the formidable challenge it would pose if invaded. They considered launching an invasion of England a complex and difficult operation, and they aimed to avoid fighting wars on two major fronts simultaneously. Hitler was convinced that by executing a surprise attack and swiftly defeating the Soviet Union, Germany could avoid the peril of a two-front war altogether.

In reality, although Great Britain and the Soviet Union engaged in a few preliminary discussions, these talks led nowhere. The deep ideological and cultural differences between the two nations were so pronounced that it became evident they would not ally directly. Instead, each would be defending or attacking a common enemy on separate fronts, rather than fighting alongside each other. Hitler, however, failed to understand or appreciate this crucial reality.



All images are from Wikimedia unless otherwise noted

In July of 1940, the Oberkommando der Wehrmacht (OKW), the high command of the German Armed Forces, had already begun drafting its strategic plans. However, Adolf Hitler was directing his own independent planning efforts. His fundamental strategic approach was summarized in a memo dated July 31, 1940, outlining his vision for the unfolding military campaign:

The object is the destruction of Russian manpower. The operation will be divided into three sections: first thrust to Kiev and secure flank protection on the Dnepr. Luftwaffe will destroy river crossings and Odessa; second thrust to Baltic States and drive on Moscow; finally, link up of northern and southern wings [presumably east of Moscow]. Successively: limited drive on the Baku oilfields [in the Caucasus].

While the Nazis maintained formal communication through official memoranda, the OKH (the Oberkommando der Heers, the High Command of the Army), rapidly issued its own within a mere few weeks, declaring that launching any significant operations in 1940 was entirely unrealistic. They pointed out that summer was already waning, winter was approaching quickly, and the Eastern Front was insufficiently prepared, with not enough divisions to even contemplate an invasion. Consequently, Hitler resolved that the optimal time to launch an attack would be in the spring of 1941.

Throughout the winter, the OKH was entrusted with formulating a bold and comprehensive strategy. The primary objective was clear: to decisively defeat the Russian army through swift, coordinated strikes aimed at breaking its lines, penetrating deep, and encircling enemy forces. This meticulous plan was divided into three critical axes. The northern thrust targeted the Baltic states and Leningrad, aiming to sever supplies and weaken the northern front. The central assault was designed to advance toward Moscow, threatening the heart of Russian resistance. Meanwhile, the southern operation aimed at Kyiv, safeguarding vital Romanian oil fields and eliminating any potential southern flank for a counterattack by the Russians. This strategic approach was crafted to deliver a decisive blow and secure victory.



General Franz Halder

In the fall of 1940, the German military had deployed a formidable force of 120 divisions in the eastern territories, each consisting of approximately 15,000 soldiers ready for combat. At the helm of strategic planning was General Franz Halder, who served as the chief of staff of the German Army High Command from 1938 to 1942. He was entrusted with the overarching responsibility of devising a comprehensive plan for the impending invasion. To carry out the intricate details of the operation, Halder consulted

with General Erich Marcks, the Chief of Staff of the 18th Army, which was operating in the east. Marcks was tasked with meticulously planning the logistical and tactical components—the nuts and bolts—that would ensure the invasion's success.

General Marcks formulated more detailed and strategic plans, emphasizing a relentless pursuit of Soviet divisions at the front lines. His primary objective was to seek out and annihilate enemy forces wherever they stood, while also aiming to take control of vital industry and densely populated centers. Fully aware that this campaign would not hinge on a single confrontation, he understood it would require a series of carefully planned and executed strategic battles across different terrains and stages.

General Friedrich Paulus, the Deputy Chief of the General Staff of the OKW, meticulously elaborated plans to integrate all branches of the armed forces into a unified, coordinated attack strategy. He concurred with the OKH that the offensive should be divided into three main thrusts, each led by a distinct army group, to maximize their effectiveness. Paulus shared the view that capturing Moscow was essential, considering it the political hub, cultural heart, and logistical nucleus of the entire empire, necessitating a formidable and focused assault on the city.



General Erich Marcks

However, in response to one of Paulus's memos, Hitler expressed a differing perspective. He dismissed the notion that Moscow held the utmost strategic importance, asserting instead that occupying Leningrad was more significant. Hitler believed that capturing Leningrad, the historic spiritual center of Bolshevism and a symbol of Soviet resilience, would deliver a severe psychological blow to the Bolsheviks. To Hitler, securing Leningrad would not only be a military victory but also a symbolic triumph that would demoralize the enemy more profoundly than capturing Moscow itself.

Even during the meticulous planning stages, a sense of confusion and doubt gradually seeped into the generals' minds. They were uncertain, based on the various memos and Hitler's replies, about the primary objective of this occupation. Nevertheless,

one fact remained clear: unexpectedly, on December 18th, 1940, Hitler officially named the invasion Barbarossa, in honor of Emperor Frederick I of the Holy Roman Empire. This German emperor had died during the Crusades, claiming he would return to defend and rescue his cherished German homeland.



Hitler and the OKW planning Barbarossa

During the winter months, Hitler's trust in his military generals' planning waned significantly. He increasingly doubted their strategies, particularly their objectives to maximize the destruction of the Russian army and their plans to seize Leningrad before even considering an assault on Moscow. In the southern front, while Hitler had access to both Slovak and Romanian forces, he distrusted their reliability and effectiveness. Rather than executing a pincer movement—surrounding enemy forces as he had successfully done in Poland and France—he opted for a single, focused thrust in the south. This decision

stemmed from his lack of confidence in the troops he trusted most, prompting a more cautious and less aggressive approach to the campaign.

By the spring, a more definitive military plan was established as Hitler personally took charge of the strategic decisions. Although he prioritized capturing Leningrad early in the campaign, he also carefully allocated his forces: the northern group was kept relatively small to conserve resources, while the central group received most of the divisions to enable a potential breakthrough. This central force was positioned to potentially launch a decisive offensive towards Moscow if the situation demanded it, whereas the southern group was assigned a moderate force. Despite being capable of



Cannons and munitions preparing for war in eastern Poland, 1941 (kanopy.com)

initiating a major offensive, this arrangement lacked the traditional pincer movements that historically made Nazi campaigns highly

effective and devastating, thus limiting their tactical flexibility.

During the winter and spring, the armed forces undertook extensive preparations for a major campaign. Unlike previous invasions of Poland or France, this operation involved an enormous territory—over one million square miles—across which the Germans aimed to expand their control. In France, the Germans deployed approximately 135 divisions to conquer around 50,000 square miles. For the larger area of one million square miles, Germany planned to field about 150 divisions, each consisting of roughly 15,000 soldiers. Some German generals privately expressed doubts about the

feasibility of such an ambitious operation, but they lacked the authority to voice their concerns publicly. Ultimately, the military leadership proceeded with the plans they had, despite the uncertainties.

Kesselschlacht. Their theory of battle would be the German term *Kesselschlacht*, which in English might be translated as "cauldron battle" or "pocket battle." The best way to describe it might be to watch lava go down a mountain. It is slow and progressive, perhaps a little uneven, but it encapsulates everything, even if, at times, one part of the lava moves faster than the other. It eventually surrounds and covers everything. That seemed like a plausible thing in the central and the north with two different thrusts surrounding troops, but in the south, there would only be one single thrust.

This strategy was also controversial because it relied on rapid, decisive strikes to encircle and isolate the enemy. During this period, troop movement primarily depended on walking, as mechanized transport was limited. The Germans correctly assessed that only about 3% of Russian roads were paved, which compromised the reliability of road networks and trucks for large-scale troop movements.

Panzer (tank) divisions had the potential to move at significantly higher speeds compared to other units. Most generals sought to maximize the Panzers' advance, using them to penetrate deep into enemy territory. This strategy involved clearing the way ahead and allowing accompanying troops to infiltrate behind enemy lines, effectively playing catch-up and conducting mop-up operations to eliminate residual Russian forces after the main breakthrough.

Hitler did not view the strategy in the same way as others. Despite his limited military experience, he was adamant that the troops and the Panzers should move together as a unit. He believed this approach would slow the rapid advance of the forces, as foot soldiers would set the pace. Although his generals offered careful advice to reconsider this tactic, Hitler remained resolute. He was concerned that exposing the Panzers without accompanying

troops could leave them vulnerable to enemy fire, potentially compromising the key advantage his mechanized units held in the field.

Production. To succeed, much more equipment would need to be produced in a short period. After all, there were only about 8 to 9 months of planning and increased industrial productivity needed to get Germany ready for such an immense project.



A Panzer unit in action - 1941

Historians now believe that the Germans probably spent too much time producing airplanes for the Luftwaffe. Unfortunately, more mundane things like winter clothing, boots, appropriate rifles, tires, and other essential items were not produced sufficiently

A total of 150,000 men were recruited into the armed forces; however, this number was deemed insufficient for such a vast territory. Due to the hurried nature of their enlistment, approximately 20% of the infantry and mountain troops were not considered fully prepared for combat at the start of the invasion, as there had not been sufficient time for complete training.

Tank production increased, and Panzer divisions grew from 10 to 21, but the number of tanks per division dropped from an average of 320 to 199. To make matters worse for the tanks, only about 4/7 were the latest models capable of

withstanding Russian attacks. While the Germans had some of the best tanks available, they did not have an adequate supply for such a vast area.

Tires became a critical logistical issue just a few months into the campaign. Since only 3% of the roads were paved, this resulted in significantly increased wear and tear on the vehicles' tires. It was estimated that the existing tire supply amounted to only about 50% of what was needed to sustain the invasion effectively. However, this shortage might soon become irrelevant, as it was believed that the invading force had enough fuel for only two months. Without fuel, vehicles would be unable to operate, forcing everyone to walk.

Another significant issue was that, for most infantry units, anti-tank guns were regarded as largely outdated, leaving soldiers exposed to Russian tanks on the battlefield. Although airplane production increased during this period, it diverted considerable resources from the overall German war economy. Ultimately, Germany had only 2,770 aircraft available for the invasion of France. While this number appears substantial, it closely matches the 2,750 aircraft Germany possessed at the start of the French campaign. Given the vastly larger Russian territory to invade, the Luftwaffe faced a major challenge due to the limited number of aircraft and the expansive area.

The Balkans issue. On April 6, 1941, Hitler expanded his military campaign into Southeast Europe, aiming to secure strategic advantages before launching an invasion of the Soviet Union. He believed that controlling this region was essential to prevent Allied forces from establishing a threatening front. By May 2, Hitler had swiftly conquered Greece and Yugoslavia, encountering only minimal resistance. The most significant opposition came from a small, yet resilient British force in Greece, which mounted a determined defense. Their resistance not only challenged the German advance



Forced labor at a munitions plant, 1941

but also disrupted German supply lines and shook Hitler's confidence, highlighting the fierce opposition faced even from comparatively small Allied contingents.

Not only was the flank dealt with before it could form, but Hitler felt that the Romanian oil fields were now more secure, and fewer divisions would be used to guard such an area.

This delay proved costly for the Germans. As a result, they postponed Operation Barbarossa until June 22, missing the crucial spring campaigning window. By then, spring had passed, and summer was on the horizon before any troops moved forward. The German leadership, well aware of the brutal Russian winters—and haunted by Napoleon's disastrous campaign—knew timing was critical. Even in 1941, many believed that launching the invasion in late June was already a risky gamble. The OKW understood they needed every possible summer day, yet they also recognized the importance of acting sooner rather than later. Waiting risked allowing the Soviets to ramp up production, reinforce their troops and supplies, and establish formidable defensive lines—conditions that could make a German invasion much more difficult. Seizing the summer of 1941 was not just strategic; it was essential to gaining the upper hand before the Soviets could fully mobilize.



Hanging the swastika at the Acropolis, Athens, Greece, 1941

The campaign in the Balkans significantly impacted the availability of supplies for the German invasion of Russia. Although precise figures are difficult to obtain, historians estimate that between 5 and 10% of essential resources such as tires and fuel had already been consumed in

the Balkan theater prior to Operation Barbarossa. Compounding this issue, 15 divisions were redirected to suppress rebellions and secure the Balkans, leaving only 135 divisions to launch the invasion into the Soviet Union. This force was comparable to the number of divisions involved in the German invasion of France, highlighting the reduced German strength at the start of the Eastern Front campaign.

Nazi estimates. One belief that boosted the Nazis' confidence was their perception that Soviet forces were in disarray. They thought that Stalin's paranoia led him to purge the elite members of his society frequently, aiming to eliminate any potential organizing rebellion before it could form. Recently, Stalin had purged many of his army's officers to prevent insurrections, a move that helped him maintain power. However, the Nazis believed this purge had also resulted in the loss of many capable commanders, weakening the Soviet military leadership.

Ahead of the winter of 1940-41, German intelligence estimated that the Soviet Union possessed approximately 130 divisions. The OKW believed these divisions to be poorly equipped, armed with outdated tanks and anti-tank weapons, and commanded by leaders lacking significant military expertise.

By the start of Operation Barbarossa, Nazi intelligence estimated that the Soviet Red Army possessed approximately 154 infantry divisions, 25½ cavalry divisions, and 37 mechanized divisions. These figures represented roughly a 25% increase over previous estimates, highlighting the unexpectedly large scale and preparedness of the Soviet forces, which posed a significant

challenge for Nazi planners.



Soviet troops defending their position, November 1941

The Nazis underestimated their potential threat, believing they might quickly be overwhelmed and disorganized like melting butter when faced with a coordinated attack. It was widely understood that their offensive needed to be swift to prevent the Soviet Eastern Divisions, now stationed in Siberia, from reinforcing the Western Front. Stalin had strategically deployed numerous divisions in the east to defend against potential Japanese aggression, recalling that Japan had previously defeated Russia in the Russo-Japanese War forty years earlier. As a result, Stalin stationed many of his best troops in the east as a precaution. Hitler was aware of these factors and sought to avoid engaging these well-fortified Soviet divisions during the summer and fall of 1941, recognizing the strength and preparedness of the Soviet forces, as well as the dangers posed by the eastern position.

German Stamp Issues During Operation Barbarossa

Compiled by Christopher Kolker MD

While one might think that German philately would follow its war effort, the collection below shows that this was simply not the case. Instead, denial and Hitler's narcissism appear to be the sign of the times, as more mundane topics prevail on their stamps. Below are all the stamps issued by the Third Reich during the Barbarossa planning and campaign.

Michel 751-9 Winter Relief fund – Nov. 5, 1940





Michel 760-1 Emil von Behring creator of the Diphtheria vaccine, Nov. 26, 1940



Stamp Day – January 12, 1941
Michel 762



Michel 763 German-Italian Military Alliance – January 30, 1941



Michel 764-7 Leipzig Spring Fair, March 1, 1941



March 8, 1941 Viennese Spring Trade Fair. Michel 768-71

April 1941 to commemorate Hitler's 52nd birthday. Michel 772





May 1941- Comradeship of the German Reich Post. Michel 773-8



June 20, 1941 Michel
779- The German
Derby

July 20, 1941, the
Brown Ribbon of
Germany





August 1, 1941 "Hitler Heads"

Barbarossa, Part II- The Campaign


Christopher Kolker MD

The largest battle in human history began on June 22, 1941, at 3:30 am. The Barbarossa campaign had officially begun. The front was to start off at 995 miles long and would eventually stretch to 1490 miles. Because of the thrust and the surrounding of Soviet troops, the Germans created a very wavy front line that at one point was 600 miles deep from its eastern to western edge. It was a considerable amount of territory and line that the Germans had to hold.

Three army groups would spearhead the advance. The northern army would go towards the Balkans, clearing Latvia, Estonia, and Lithuania. Subsequently, the army would turn towards Leningrad.

The central army planned to encircle enemy troops stationed on the western frontier, west of Moscow, employing a pincer movement to capture or eliminate the forces caught in the trap. Although the army was expected to advance towards Moscow, Hitler insisted that the city should not be the primary goal of the operation, emphasizing the elimination of Red Army divisions instead.

The southern army planned to advance southward towards Kyiv, then shift further southeast toward the Black Sea, ultimately entering the Crimean Peninsula. Their objectives included securing key troop positions, capturing vital industrial areas, and gaining control of the Black Sea ports to facilitate supply and strategic dominance. Unlike a pincer movement, which involves coordinated attacks from multiple directions, the southern strategy focused on a single, concentrated thrust southward with one major group leading the push.



At the onset of the battle, the OKH, the army command, was divided in its strategies. The majority believed their primary objective was to march on Moscow to capture the Red Army's administrative headquarters, which was crucial to disrupting enemy command and control. These generals thought that advancing to Moscow would force the Red Army to commit forces to defend its capital, thereby potentially weakening overall resistance.

By doing so, they believed they could avoid Napoleon's catastrophic fate. During Napoleon's 1812 invasion of Russia, the Russians implemented a strategic retreat, evacuating Moscow and leaving the city largely deserted. The OKH had no prior indication that the Russians would retreat again in this

manner. The Red Army eventually regrouped to make a last stand on the outskirts of Moscow. The Russians' decision to defend the city significantly contributed to the eventual Russian victory, as Moscow's fall would have crippled their strategic position.

During the initial days of the campaign, the Northern and Central Armies made significant progress, advancing more than 20 miles daily. The mechanized Panzers performed exceptionally well, outperforming the Russian defenses, which appeared unprepared for their speed and tactics. Despite this momentum, Hitler advised his generals to hold back the Panzers at



A panzer unit advancing on the plains of west-central Russia, 1941 – A special thanks to www.rarehistoricalphotos.com

various points to prevent them from outrunning the supporting infantry, many of whom still relied on foot due to limited motorized transport. Fortunately, the roads were in good condition and dry during

early summer, enabling the infantry to keep pace with the fast-moving armored units.

In and around Minsk, with the central army group, the quick-strike invasion slowed considerably as tanks waited for the troops to catch up. But around Minsk on June 30, the OKH decided to wait to consolidate forces, so they began encircling Minsk only on July 3. Those three days allowed the Soviets to regroup significantly.

To make matters worse for the OKH, Hitler personally intervened. Once more, he wanted the troops with the Panther divisions and felt that the Panzers could not afford to be so exposed, further slowing the pace.

Significant rains came on July 4, slowing troop transport considerably. In the central region, almost all roads were dirt. And they could not cross the Dnepr until July 16. Meanwhile, Soviet troops further east regrouped and retooled.



German infantry surveying the front, July 10, 1941 A special thanks to www.rarehistoricalphotos.com

The pincer movement largely succeeded for the central army, with the Germans skillfully bypassing large Russian troop concentrations. They encircled these troops in a substantial pocket to the west of the Dnepr River, which comprised mostly disorganized and terrified soldiers. This encirclement resulted in a significant defeat, with the pockets' remaining forces finally surrendering on August 5.

The recurring issues involved dealing with surrounded troops, which resulted in increasing delays, extending the operation over more days. The pace of progress was too slow for the OKH, and concerns grew about potential

adverse weather conditions and the arrival of an early winter, which could further complicate the situation.

The situation rapidly deteriorated as Hitler issued an unexpected order for the Second Army and the Second Panzer Group, a significant portion of the central forces, to advance toward Kyiv to capture the encircled Soviet troops there. This decision diverted a large contingent of the German forces southward, away from the strategic eastward push toward Moscow or the remaining Soviet defenses. Military analysis suggests that this move involved reallocating some of the best-trained and most organized troops to mop-up operations, potentially undermining the overall efficiency of the German advance.

These Russian troops had already been encircled without any support, with their food and munitions supplies imminent to run out.

This situation reduced the Nazi need to allocate significant resources to capture them. However, Hitler was determined to eliminate Russian troops wherever they were found, aiming to remove them from the war entirely. As a result, the main German military effort shifted southward.

The OKH convinced Hitler to resume their advance toward Roslavl, and by August 3, German forces had captured the city. While this marked a progress, the OKH considered it only a modest step, falling short of their more



*A German soldier overlooks the burning bridge across the Dnieper leading to Kiev.
A special thanks to www.rarehistoricalphotos.com*

aggressive objectives. They were aware that September would bring the rainy season, which would hinder operations. Time was running out for the Germans, as they still had a considerable distance to Moscow, with hundreds of thousands of Russian troops positioned between them and the Soviet capital, presenting a significant obstacle to their advance.

The Northern Army. The Northern Army Group encountered minimal resistance as it advanced into the Baltic States of Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia, quickly subduing their forces within a few days. Historically, Russian leader Joseph Stalin's policies had negatively impacted these nations, leading many residents to harbor mixed feelings toward the Nazi occupation; some perceived the Nazis as potentially better overlords simply because they represented a change from Soviet control. By July 14th, the 23rd day of their invasion, the Baltic states had been fully subdued, with Leningrad only 60 miles away. A key factor in the Northern Army's rapid success was their willingness to largely ignore Hitler's direct orders, allowing Panzer units to continue advancing without halt, while infantry units followed behind as quickly as possible.

On July 7, Hitler issued orders for the Northern Army Group to encircle Leningrad as part of the broader Operation Barbarossa. One division moved east of Leningrad to block resupply routes, while another advanced from the west, aiming to tighten the blockade around the city.

Two major issues arose during the campaign. First, the two groups were separated by over 100 miles, which increased their vulnerability to counterattacks and guerrilla tactics from local resistance forces. Second, the group positioned west of Leningrad faced difficult marching conditions in marshy terrain, causing delays and preventing it from covering more than a few miles each day.

Hitler saw this, but was not too concerned at the time, not knowing the siege of Leningrad would become one of the most horrific sieges in world history. He felt comfortable surrounding the city and going on. Hitler once told one of his

generals that if he simply surrounded the city, he would not have to provide provisions for it that winter, freeing up more supplies for his troops.

The Southern Army. The Southern Army group launched its attack later than the Center and Northern Army groups, which began their operations a week earlier. Hitler, concerned about the possibility of a counterattack from the south, ordered his troops in that region to adopt defensive positions initially, aiming to strengthen their preparedness and respond effectively to any threats.

After a week, when it appeared that there would be no significant counterattack, Hitler ordered the Southern Army Group to advance. Due to mistrust of the Slovak and Romanian divisions within the group, he adopted a cautious approach. Adverse weather conditions and poor organization within the Southern Army Group further slowed their progress, limiting their advance to only 10 miles per day. By August 8, they had captured only 103,000 Soviet soldiers, a relatively small figure compared to the Soviet army's total strength, which numbered in the millions. To put it in perspective, overall, during Operation Barbarossa, 3.5 million Soviet troops were captured, and four million others were killed.

The German forces initially advanced toward Kyiv, but Hitler personally ordered the city to be encircled rather than captured directly. Similar to the central troops, they carried out extensive mop-up operations against the encircled Soviet troops. Because they operated as a single group without pincer movements, they relied on the southern flank of the Central Army Group to help subdue Soviet forces east of Kyiv. Eventually, the German forces shifted their focus toward Crimea and the Black Sea region; however, their progress was slow and yielded limited strategic advantages.

The Operation Barbarossa Occupation Issues of Germany

Part 1 – The Baltics

Christopher Kolker MD

While Germany had many occupation issues during WWII, only a subset were printed in the East during the fighting of Operation Barbarossa. Most were produced in Estonia, which had greeted the Nazis warmly as an alternative to Stalin's Russian occupation.

Because of the rapid change, Nazi authorities were able to begin producing their stamps more quickly. Below are some of the national and local products produced during Operation Barbarossa. Many others were made, but you get the idea!

Estonia:



August 7-12, 1941 Estonia Michel 1-3



September 22, 1941, Estonia Michel 4-9

Pernau Aug 16, 1941, Michel 5-10 type II





Eliva local stamps, Michel 1-8 July 10, 1941



Left and right: Michel #3 and #7, August 4, 1941





Otepää Michel #2, Type 2, July 22, 1941



Eliva- Overprinted stamps from the Moscow Agricultural Exhibition of 1940



From Puka, Estonia, never official – It seemed to simply appear on the scene in July 1941.

Lithuania

Zargrad, Lithuania-
This is legitimate and
dated June 26, 1941





Lithuania Michel 1-9 General Issues July 5, 1941




Southern
Lithuanian
Vilna Area,
July 16,
1941
Michel 10-
17



Lithuania Rokiškis, June 30, 1941 Michel #5a2 and 7a2





Russian stamps overprinted on July 3, 1941 for use in the city of Telsiai





Raseiniai, Lithuania, Michel #1-7 – From the End of June 1941



Ponewesch, Lithuania, Michel #1-9, end of June to July 1941.



Zargrad, Lithuania, June 30, 1941, Michel 1a1 to 5a1

Barbarossa, Part III - the Failure

Christopher Kolker MD

By August 8, 1941, marking the end of the initial phase of Operation Barbarossa, German forces had suffered greater losses than anticipated. Before the invasion began on June 22, the OKW, the German military command, believed that the Red Army was poorly led, lacked sufficient equipment, and was inadequately trained. The Nazi high command aimed to encircle and quickly dismantle most of the Western Red Army with minimal resistance. However, this plan did not unfold as expected. Within just five weeks, by July 31, the Germans had lost approximately 213,000 troops and 863 tanks, highlighting the unexpectedly fierce Soviet resistance and logistical challenges faced.

Despite seeming minor, the loss of 2-3 million Russian troops during this initial phase was less significant, especially considering the Germans had far fewer manpower reserves. The Nazi forces had lost over 15% of their total troops, with conservative estimates suggesting a 20% reduction in their military effectiveness. For a relatively small force aiming to conquer 1 million square miles, the loss of 863 tanks—nearly a third of their tank strength—was a substantial blow. Many tanks were not completely destroyed but mechanically incapacitated, leaving them unable to continue fighting. These losses highlighted the severe impact of insufficient industrial preparation for Operation Barbarossa, which was hindering German logistical and combat capacity.

The Northern Army Group's Panzers experienced very few tank losses, losing maybe only about 10% of their capability. However, that number was 40% in the central region and 60% in the South. In the South, mechanical failures and getting stuck in muddy rural areas were very common. In the north, a

disastrous attempt to cross marshy fields resulted in nearly 50% of their light vehicles being lost.

During World War II, the Nazis attempted to compensate for logistical setbacks by seizing railroads, believing this would help them mitigate losses and facilitate the transport of troops, supplies, and ammunition. However, a significant obstacle arose: the Russian and German railway gauges differed, requiring trains to be unloaded, transferred, and reloaded onto Russian tracks. Additionally, as the front lines shifted and territory was lost, the Russians often destroyed their own tracks to hinder the German advance, further complicating transportation efforts and reducing the effectiveness of the German strategy.



Too much of this- with equipment disabled, horses became a reluctant tool of transportation. German troops transporting supplies just east of Finland, July 1941.

By the first of August, the OKH was in a panic. They had obviously made advances and shocked the world, but they also knew they were running out of supplies and manpower. They still wanted to go to Moscow to cut the head off the apparatus if they could.

The defenders remained confident that the Russian

front was still intact, with new divisions being deployed and organized units still in place that the Germans had not yet compromised. The OKH was also aware that German troops were becoming exhausted and that progress in the south was unacceptably slow. German efforts to quickly clear pockets of resistance—expecting to eliminate them within hours or a few days—consistently faced strong opposition, causing significant delays and hindering overall German advances.

The OKH decided to focus on existing Russian troops to the east and industrial areas in Ukraine around Leningrad and Moscow as the main targets.

Changing objectives. Hitler basically decided that the Germans would now go on to Moscow. The OKH had given him three choices: they could take Leningrad, go to Moscow, or focus much more on the South, toward the industrial areas of the Ukraine and the Southern oil fields.

Hitler thought that the Russians had lost the war. He believed that they were days away from Russia essentially surrendering their western front and that just a bit more pressure would be all that it would take to carry the day. So when presented with one of those three choices, Hitler simply said yes. He wanted all three done, and despite some losses and the difficulty of transport, he felt that the alterations could be made.

The Army was aghast. Army leadership could not believe it. They felt like he was asking for the impossible, but to directly contradict Adolf Hitler would mean probable death.



Surrendered Russian troops passing by German troops, outside of Kyiv, 1941

Meanwhile, intelligence came through that the Russians were defending the center more than the north or the south, trying to defend Moscow. The Germans didn't know it at the time, but they had increased their divisions from 200 to 360 by pulling troops from Central Asia and beginning to infiltrate some all the way from Siberia. While the Germans were correct in suggesting that these troops were ill-trained and ill-equipped, they were still troops, and the Germans had to acknowledge that these were people in the field who must be defeated. All that the Germans knew was that despite their

incredible gains and massive amounts of POWs taken, there seemed to be as many or more in the field now than there were at the beginning of the war.

Still, Hitler was worried about the flanks. One reason he wanted to advance further north and south was that he felt that piercing into the center of Russia towards Moscow might leave the flanks exposed to a Soviet counterattack and a major army group surrounded by Russian troops.

Because of the increasing desperation and unlikelihood of success, the OKH finally issued a memo that disagreed with Hitler. They wanted to consolidate forces and go to Moscow. Made the point that time was of the essence, fuel was running out, and manpower was such that they needed to have one concentrated battle and that they could not defeat the Russians everywhere.

The memo issued on August 20th was greeted with another memo on August 21st, where he simply rejected it. In it, Hitler blamed OKH for the Barbarossa lack of progress and said that subordinates to the OKH had too much power and that there was too much independent decision-making in the field. He felt that if orders were followed strictly, the Nazis would not be in this situation, and the outcome would be much better.

Historically, this criticism is not regarded as fair, as the OKH (Oberkommando des Heeres) was doing the best it could, given the circumstances. The OKH was led by a military strategist who was largely inexperienced, and at times, this was quite evident. The officers had to follow his commands under the threat of death, forcing them to make the best decisions possible under dire conditions. Their strategic focus was likely correct in concentrating on Moscow early in the campaign, rather than attempting to defend the entire vast territory, which would have been unfeasible.

The South. In the southern theater of the Eastern Front during World War II, Hitler emphasized the strategic importance of encircling Kyiv by instructing that Army Group South was to surround the city. Additionally, part of Army Group Central was directed to advance toward Kyiv but not to continue further east at this stage. Hitler's firm stance on this strategic plan provoked near

open defiance from his generals, who recognized that overextending their forces could lead to disastrous losses or even their own deaths.



Troops being transported near Finland after the initial train and track had been destroyed by the Russians, September 1941.

Despite the risks, most of the OKH

(Oberkommando des Heeres) and field commanders considered the proposed approach essentially suicidal, reflecting the high tension and divergent views within the German high command regarding the viability of their military objectives during this phase of the campaign.

In order to make his point on August 23rd, Hitler sends his first armored divisions to the north and his Army Central Group's southern divisions to the south. Both have now been diverted away from a possible eastern drive, away from the center, making the penetration to Moscow even more unlikely.

The OKH had to do something, as this strategy did not make much sense. Instead of simply criticizing Hitler and ensuring their own execution, they planned new operations to coerce Hitler to change his mind. Called Operation Typhoon, it proposed invading Moscow with 70 divisions and a smaller, consolidated front of just 400 miles, something the Germans could still pull off.

But by the time Hitler decides, the rainy season has begun.

Because troop and supply transports were slow to move due to logistical issues with trains and a lack of fuel, Operation Typhoon did not commence until September 30. Fall brings the rainy season to western Russia, which initially hampers military operations, but at first, the weather remains dry, favoring the Nazis. During the first two weeks, the German forces advanced approximately 150 miles eastward. Utilizing various pincer movements, they captured a total of 670,000 prisoners, significantly impacting Soviet defenses in the region.

By October 6, their initial luck begins to decline as snow and rain return to the region, impacting mobility. Approximately one week later, fuel supplies for trucks and tanks become critically low. Consequently, the mechanized units that had previously advanced at an average of 11 miles per day slowed significantly, covering at most about 5 miles per day, thereby hindering their operational capability.

The Soviets continue to resist. 101 total German divisions were placed for this thrust, but by the middle of October, that's down to 65. Even worse, 17 diluted Panzer divisions were down to six. The entire German army of 136 divisions was down to 83 and 31 supply trains confiscated from Russia, down to 16.



Russian guerrillas like these significantly slowed Hitler's progress during Operation Barbarossa, photo taken in July 1941.

German industrial productivity deficits concerning basic supplies in anticipation of Barbarossa are increasingly causing serious problems. German troops lack adequate winter clothing, which hampers their

effectiveness in cold conditions. Additionally, as fuel and tires become scarce, the Germans are forced to overrely on horses for transportation, further impacting their logistical capabilities.

By mid-October, Hitler believed that the Red Army was nearing collapse, prompting the Germans to push

forward. At this point, the German forces were only 50 miles from the outskirts of Moscow. Despite facing exhaustion, severe cold, and hunger, the German army launched a renewed offensive on November 5, aiming for a decisive strike to cause chaos and undermine Soviet defenses. However, by November 12, temperatures in Moscow had plummeted to minus 8 degrees Fahrenheit, complicating the German attack and affecting troop performance.

Reports come back to the OKW and Hitler about German troops freezing to death. Even worse, Siberians were starting to infiltrate into Russian divisions, and the Germans were aware that reinforcements had arrived for the Russians. Unsurprisingly, the Siberians were dressed appropriately and very much used to the cold weather.

By November 27, the German forces were only 19 miles from Moscow. Since the invasion began on June 22, they had suffered the loss of 743,000 men due to injury and death, accounting for approximately 23% of their total army. This significant attrition highlighted the immense logistical and strategic challenges of conquering and holding such a vast territory. The German High Command (OKH) estimated that they were now short of 340,000 troops needed to sustain their ambitious invasion plans.



Soviet anti-aircraft guns protect Moscow, October 1941

On December 5th, after a last-ditch effort, the OKH accepted the inevitable defeat. As Soviet forces had already begun counterattacking, they allowed local commanders to choose whether to initiate a retreat or continue the attack. All commanders near Moscow elected to fall back. By December 8th, even Hitler recognized the necessity of retreating, fearing a significant counterattack that could obliterate the Central Army Group. Consequently, the Army Central Group withdrew approximately 90 miles to more defensible positions, where they faced a brutal winter. This marked the end of Operation Barbarossa.

The Operation Barbarossa Occupation Issues of Germany-Part 2 – Russia

Christopher Kolker MD

Operation Barbarossa became the ultimate quagmire for the Germans and sowed the seeds of destruction for the Third Reich. Because of the intense resistance and slower progression, the Germans produced fewer new stamps in the region. Still, a few were made in the far western regions of Russia. Here are a few samples for your perusal:



Ljady in modern Belarus, December 1941

Luga: (Prepared but never officially issued)



Luga overprinted stamps, October 1941 I-IV



Pskov, Michel #2-8, Late 1941



Pskov Michel #10-11, Late 1941



Michel #13 Pskov, this miniature sheet with known fraudulent copies, was originally printed on December 1, 1941, to aid the city kindergartens



Ukraine- November 1941

Heydrich Memorialized

by Phil Rhoads

Editor's note: This is simply the best exhibit of the Heydrich death mask stamp you will ever find. Enjoy!

HEYDRICH MEMORIALIZED

This section shows how Heydrich was commemorated by Nazi Germany and the Protektorat.




Reinhard Heydrich "Deathmask" Issue

Issued on 28 May 1943, one year after the assassination attack. This is the only stamp, other than those for Hitler, issued by the Third Reich recognizing a specific person.

First Day Picture Postcard send from a grandson to his grandfather.

Note street address: R. Heydrich nábř. (R. Heydrich Embankment). On 18 October 1942, the Vltava Embankment in Prague was renamed the Reinhard Heydrich Embankment.


This represents the proper use (postcard rate, 60h) for the postal denomination of the Heydrich Deathmask stamp. This is a semi-postal stamp; the distribution of the charity value (440h) is unknown.



Picture side of the postcard, showing the Charles Bridge crossing the Vltava River, looking eastward. The Vltava/Heydrich Embankment is the first street beyond the buildings on the east bank of the river.



The renamed street sign.



Heydrich Block
with original envelope (c)

This official souvenir sheet was issued in a quantity of 1000 with a printed control number and was intended for presentation to high ranking Nazi officials and others of importance attending a memorial service in Prague on the first anniversary of Heydrich's death.

A census published in Germany (ca. early-1980s) listed 70 recorded Heydrich Block numbers. Exhibitor's coordination of updating the census has increased the number of recorded Heydrich Blocks to over 160. Of these, only 20 have the accompanying envelope.

1904 A. 4. VI. 1942

1842 Date Flaw

Exhibitor's research indicates all Heydrich Blocks have the 1842 flaw.

HEYDRICH MEMORIALIZED
DEATHMASK ISSUE ~ PLATE FLAW



The "egg-on-head" is a constant plate variety occurring in plate positions 9, 19, 29, 39, and 49.



Normal stamp



Egg-on-head variety



- Plate positions
- 9
 - 19
 - 29
 - 39
 - 49

HEYDRICH MEMORIALIZED
DEATHMASK ISSUE ~ DATE FLAWS

The 1904 in Heydrich's birth date sometimes appears as "1804" and the 1942 in his death date sometimes appears as "1842". These are printing flaws, not constant plate varieties, and can appear in any position on the pane. They can appear individually as well as combined.



Center stamp in bottom row has both 1804 and 1842 varieties.



"1804" Variety



"1842" Variety

Hoffmann studio maximum card
with both 1804 and 1842 varieties.

Heinrich Hoffmann was famous as Hitler's personal photographer. He financially capitalized on this relationship and was arrested after the war as a "war profiteer" and served four years in prison. He was released 31 May 1950.





Registered, early use. The Deathmask stamp was issued 28 May 1943. This cover is post-marked 27 May 1943, the actual first anniversary of the attack on Heydrich.

This is also the "Egg-on-Head" plate variety.

Sorgfältig aufbewahren! - Pečlivě uschovávejte!
Der Absender wird gebeten, nur den umrandeten Teil anzufüllen — Odesílatel vyplní jen sítně ohraničenou část

Einlieferungsschein — Podací listek


Gegenstand: Brief Nr. 173
Vác: *) psaní *) Cls.

Nachnahme:	K	h	Ge- wicht:	kg	g
Do- birka:			Váha:		
Wert oder Betrag:					
Cena nebo částka:					K 3 h 30
Emp- fänger: Adress:	Václ. Lamuska				
Bestim- mungs- ort: Misto určení:	Přechov - Přebuzec				

Postannahme - Přijal

Tagestempel: OLMÜTZ 250
27.V.43-17

*) Erklärung der Abkürzungen umseitig.
*) Zkratky jsou vysvětleny na druhé straně.
12 A (1-1942) J. St. P.



HEYDRICH MEMORIALIZED
DEATHMASK ISSUE -- MEMORIAL BOOKLET


Official Heydrich
Memorial Booklet

Published in a quantity of only 25

with two blocks of four, one mint and one post-marked 4 June 1943, the first anniversary of Heydrich's death. One booklet was published with a special "silk" cover for presentation to Hitler. The other booklets had heavy card covers.



This particular booklet shows evidence of scorching on the back cover, possibly indicating it was rescued from burning at the last minute.

Booklet cover is inscribed with the "SS" lightning bolt rune and Heydrich's name, birth date, and death date.






First Day of Issue
Gedenkblätter

Several different Gedenkblätter (memory cards) were privately produced and canceled in conjunction with the Deathmask stamp. They were postmarked on the first day of issue (28 May 1943) or on the first anniversary of Heydrich's death (4 June 1943).



The Gedenkblätter exhibited on these pages represent a complete showing of those listed in Horst Engel's catalog of Bohemia and Moravia memory cards, pages, and envelopes.

This Gedenkblatt is a paste-up. The black square is pasted on the printed card with the postmarked stamp card pasted on the black square.



Reinhard Heydrich

1942 4./6. 1943

*Normal variety (above, left);
watermarked paper variety (above)*



*First Death
Anniversary
Gedenkblätter.*

*The significance of the
numbers (543 above; 630/631
right) is unknown; perhaps an
effort to simulate the serial
number on the Heydrich Block.*

*This format is known
with the 630 or 631 n
in the lower right cor*



The Deathmask stamp was valid for postage from 28 May to 30 September 1943.

Left: Registered, last day of use cover to Germany, 30 September 1943.

Below: Late use, 19 November 1943.

Cover is airmail, registered, and censored to Slovakia. Vienna 20 November backstamp. Red censor backstamp.



REINHARD HEYDRICH



Heydrich Memorial Booklet printed on hand-made paper with hard cover.

After the assassination, SS-Reichsführer Heinrich Himmler ordered production of a memorial book in Heydrich's honor. A total of 150,000 copies were printed: 20,000 on hand-made paper, 40,000 on quality art paper, and 90,000 on ordinary paper. Between 2,000-3,000 of the hand-made paper books were to be bound with stiff cardboard hard covers; all other copies would have lighter weight covers. During a Berlin bombing raid on 31 March 1944, the bindery preparing the hard cover books was destroyed. It is unknown how many copies survived.

Exhibitor knows of only one other copy, which is in the Czech Army Museum in Prague.

22 June 1943
issue of Český
Filatelista

Front page article
about the Death-
mask issue. The
bold type infor-
mation under the
Deathmask stamp
on the right is
titled Stamp and
Miniature Sheet.
The second para-
graph describes
the Heydrich
Block; the fourth
paragraph the
Egg-on-Head
variety.

Český Filatelista
was a philatelic
journal published
by Klub Českých
Filatelistu v
Praze. First pub-
lished in 1896.
Ceased publica-
tion after 8 issues
in 1944.

Číslo 6

V Praze 22. června 1943 Ročník 48
Jednotlivé číslo K 150

Český filatelista



NEJSTARŠÍ ODBORNÝ ČASOPIS SBĚRATELŮ
Zal. r. 1896. - Odborný dozor: prof. Ing. Dr. Rudolf Gilbert
Rediguje BOHUMIL SEVČÍK, vedoucí redaktor.
Předplácí se: na celý rok K 20.- (i s poštovným). - Do Říše a na
Slovensko K 24.- (i s pošt.). - Telefon 264-24. Účet pošt. spoř. 10745

Na paměť Reinharda Heydricha

Protektorátní pošta vydala dne 28. května 1943 na paměť padlého Zastupujícího říšského protektora v Čechách a na Moravě, 4-Obergruppenführera a generála policie Reinharda Heydricha příležitostnou poštovní známku hodnoty 60 + 440 h v barvě černé. Příplatek jde ve prospěch nadace na paměť Reinharda Heydricha.

Na známce je reprodukována posmrtná maska Reinharda Heydricha, kterou vytvořil profesor F. Rotter. V horním levém rohu známkového obrazu je dále nápis Reinhard Heydrich s datem narození a úmrtí a pod tím runa 4. Hodnotová a menší příplatková číslice jsou uvedeny v levém dolním rohu známkového obrazu. Na horním okraji známek v barevném podélném pásu je nápis DEUTSCHES REICH a v známkovém obraze na dolním okraji nápis BÖHMEN UND MÄHREN, provedený menšími písmeny.

Bližší podrobnosti úpravy známky jsou zřejmé z vyobrazení.

Známky mají tvar obdélníku na výšku velkého formátu, hřebenové zoubkování a jsou tištěny měditiskem z hloubky v listech po 100 kusech. Omezený náklad známek byl vydán v aršících o jedné známce na žlutavém papíru.

Známky platí v poštovním styku vnitřním a mezinárodním do konce září 1943 a prodávají se u poštovních úřadů od 28. května 1943 do 5. června 1943 za cenu jejich jmenovité hodnoty zvýšenou o příplatek, t. j. za 5 K až do vyčerpání zásoby. Výplatní hodnotou pro vypláčení poštovních zásilek jest jediné jejich jmenovitá hodnota (60 h). Výměna známek se nepovoluje. Prodávacům poštovních cennin a poštovním se provise z prodeje těchto známek nepovoluje.

Poštovní úřady budou těmito známkami zásobeny Poštovní technikou ústřednou v Praze po pří-

padě poštovním hospodářským úřadem v Brně z moci úřední.

O odvodu těchto známek bude vydáno zvláštní ustanovení.

(Č. 16801-I/3
z 18. května 1943.)



ZNÁMKY A ARŠÍK

Pamětní aršík byl vydán dne 4. června majitelům pozvánky, kteří se zúčastnili pietní smuteční slavnosti na pražském Hradě.

Je tištěn na žlutém papíře, v levém rohu je vytištěno pořadové číslo. Velikost aršíku: výška 14½ cm, šíře 10.01 cm.


U známek zjistil jsem dva odstíny barvy: intenzivně černou a šedočernou. V pravém dolním rohu archu je umístěn nápis: Bildhauer Fr. Rotter.

Typický chybotisk — bílá skvrna ve vlasech — se nalézá na 9, 19, 29, 39 a 49 známce v archu. Jsou to právě známky Velkoříše, na kterých je zobrazena runa 4, jakož i narození a úmrtí není označeno hvězdičkou a křížkem, nýbrž také runovým znakem. Zároveň jsou to právě známky Protektorátu na kterých chybí nápis Čechy a Morava.

Před vydáním pamětních známek byla svolána poštovní správou konference se zástupci organizací sběratelů německých i českých (Ústředí), vedoucími redaktory odborného tisku a zástupcem obchodníků s poštovními známkami, Patričným přiděl pamětních známek byl poštovní správou zaručen: organizovaným sběratelům, stálým členům novinové služby denního a odborného tisku, jakož i obchodníkům.

Známky byly prodávány u všech poštovních úřadů v Protektorátě. O známky byl velký zájem.

HEYDRICH MEMORIALIZED
DEATHMASK ISSUE ~ STAMP DEALER



Postcard offering Deathmask issue for sale

Sent from dealer Helene Vlček in Sadská to Berlin
26 October 1943

Sadská, 25 October 1943

Dear Company,

I offer:

Bohemia-Moravia mourning stamp 60 H plus 440 H
issued on 28 May 1943, mint, for the price of

RM 9

per 1 piece, plus postage of RM 0.62

Delivery against cash, minimum purchase 5 pieces


The offer is for orders received until 6 November
1943.

I am happy to await your order

respectfully
Helene Vlček
Sadská 481
Bohemia






HEYDRICH MEMORIALIZED
DEATHMASK ISSUE ~ GEDENKBLÄTTER



Different date typefaces
(serif left,
sans serif right)


Kladno (left postmark)
is the nearest town of
significant size to Lidice
and was the district
headquarters for the
Gestapo agents involved
in the Lidice massacre.

Pardubice (Pardubitz)
(right postmark) is a
city in which several
paratroopers had hid-
den at various times
during their undercover
operations.



only
uber
r.

HEYDRICH MEMORIALIZED
RENAMED REGIMENT
POSTAL STATIONERY



Feldpost (fieldpost) from Reinhard Heydrich Regiment
After Heydrich's death, the SS-Gebirgsjäger (Mountain Troops) Regiments 6 & 11 of the
SS-Gebirgsjäger Division Nord (North) were renamed in his honor.

1942 Postal
Stationery
with Heydrich
memorial
imprint.



The Heydrich Death Mask Stamp in the News

Clark Lee brings us this article from Linn's Stamp News about a recent article:



First part of Keith Stupell collection highlights day three of Nov. 11-13 Dutch Country Auctions sale

Trio of name collections, U.S. and worldwide stamps, postal history in Sept. 30-Oct. 2 Kelleher Flagship auction



PLUS: William F. Buckley Jr. press sheet unexpectedly sells out
Page 7

Austrian Post continues Music series Sept. 10
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Ireland stamps mark 25 years of boy band Westlife
Page 12

First part of Keith Stupell collection highlights day three of Nov. 11-13 Dutch Country Auctions sale

BY SCOTT TIFFNEY


Dutch Country Auctions will conduct a 1,723-lot sale Nov. 11-13 at its office in Wilmington, Del. Each day's session will begin at 10 a.m. Eastern Time, and all items will be up for online bids through Stamp Auction Network.

The first two days of the auction, Nov. 11-12, will include many United States and worldwide singles, covers and collection lots, including larger groups of U.S. plate blocks, Dorothy Knapp covers, Ryukyu Islands proofs, and many lots consigned by the American Philatelic Society.

The highlight of the three-day auction will be the third day, Nov. 13, which will be exclusively devoted to the first part of the Keith Stupell (1939-2024) collection of Germany and related materials. Further items from the collection will be up for bids in future Dutch Country auctions in January and March 2026.

Stupell began collecting at the age of 7 and is widely known in philatelic circles to have assembled one of the most comprehensive and rare collections of World War I and World War II German philately, postal history and collectibles.

"We are honored to be the firm entrusted by the Keith Stupell estate to make available for the first time his extraordinary collection of German World War I and World War II material along with the many other unique items in his vast collection," Dutch Country said. "During his lifetime Keith amassed one of the most complete and diverse collections of Germany and Germany-



The third day of the Nov. 11-13 Dutch Country Auctions sale will be devoted exclusively to items from the collection of Keith Stupell, a renowned collector of World War I and World War II German philately. One highlight of the sale is the rare 60 halera + 44th black Reinhard Heydrich Death Mask special souvenir sheet of Bohemia and Moravia. The mint, never-hinged sheet is in very fine condition with original gum and is numbered 528 of 1,000 printed. The sheet is valued at approximately \$35,100.

related stamps, covers, postcards, literature and ephemera."

One of the more noteworthy lots from the Stupell collection up for bids is the rare 60 haleru + 440h black Reinhard Heydrich (1904-42) Death Mask special souvenir sheet of Bohemia and Moravia. The sheet, issued on May 28, 1943, was created to commemorate the first anniversary of the assassination of Heydrich, who was the acting Reich Protector of Bohemia and Moravia.

The sheet is numbered 528 of 1,000 printed, of which "about half were handed out to Nazi Party dignitaries and the other half was destroyed," Dutch Country said, with "likely fewer than 100 having survived." The sheet is described as never hinged in very fine condition with original gum.

According to the Michel catalog, the sheet is valued at €30,000 (approximately \$35,100 in mid-September). Also available in the Nov. 13 sale is a typed letter on SS stationery signed by Heydrich.

Another noteworthy item to cross the auction block on Nov. 13 will be the 1-rupee + 2r Azad Hind propaganda stamp that was printed to promote an independent India supported by Germany.

The Azad Hind stamps are a set of 10 stamps with six designs that were prepared but never issued for the planned provisional government of Free India under Subhas Chandra Bose (1897-1945), leader of the Indian Nationalist Party.

All stamps in the set were printed by photogravure in



A second noteworthy item from the Stupell collection up for bids on Nov. 13 during the Dutch Country auction is the 1-rupee + 2r Azad Hind propaganda stamp. The Azad Hind stamps are a set of 10 stamps with six designs that were prepared but never issued for the planned provisional government of Free India. Three versions of the 1r + 2r denomination proofs exist with elements of the design in different colors, with the rarest being the version with elements in black and orange. The mint, never-hinged imperf proof shown here is printed on orange surfaced paper and is valued at approximately \$2,350 in unused, hinged condition.

sheets of 100 at the Reichsdruckerei, the Government Printing Bureau in Berlin.

The highest denomination in the set is the 1r + 2r stamp, of which a very small number were produced. Three versions of the proofs exist with elements of the design in different colors. One version has black, orange and green elements, one has just black, and a third has black and orange. All three proof versions will be

offered during the sale.

The rarest is the version with black and orange elements. As stated in the lot description, this imperf proof is "printed on orange surfaced paper, w/ gum, NH, VF." The Michel catalog estimates its value at €2,000 (\$2,350) in unused, hinged condition. No value in the catalog is given for the proof in mint, never-hinged condition.

Many other proofs and essays from Germany will cross the auction block during the sale, as well as proofs and essays from occupied Poland, Bohemia and Moravia, Saar and French zones. In addition, the auction's final day will include Stupell's collection of German colonial postcards, poster stamps and several valuable booklets.

Other areas of interest to bidders include catapult covers (mostly non-German), Bohemia and Moravia covers, propaganda and forgery stamps from both sides in World War I and World War II, and Spanish Civil War ephemera.

Dutch Country has prepared two catalogs (Nos. 361 and 361A, the latter being for the Stupell collection only) for the Nov. 11-13 sale that can be viewed and are available for download on the Dutch Country website, <https://dutchcountryauctions.com>. Online bids may be placed through Stamp Auction Network.

Information also is available from Dutch Country Auctions, 4115 Concord Pike, Wilmington, DE 19803 or via email at auctions@dutchcountryauctions.com.

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135*	\$1,750.00	211*	\$2,000.00	412*	\$2,000.00	778-780 ea.	\$21.00	880*	\$10.00	980*	\$40.00
135*	\$1,750.00	212*	\$2,000.00	413*	\$2,000.00	740-40 ea.	\$600.00	881*	\$10.00	981*	\$10.00
135*	\$1,750.00	213*	\$2,000.00	414*	\$2,000.00	740-41 ea.	\$21.00	882*	\$20.00	982*	\$10.00
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135*	\$1,750.00	215*	\$2,000.00	416*	\$2,000.00	740-43 ea.	\$21.00	884*	\$20.00	984*	\$10.00
135*	\$1,750.00	216*	\$2,000.00	417*	\$2,000.00	740-44 ea.	\$21.00	885*	\$20.00	985*	\$10.00
135*	\$1,750.00	217*	\$2,000.00	418*	\$2,000.00	740-45 ea.	\$21.00	886*	\$20.00	986*	\$10.00
135*	\$1,750.00	218*	\$2,000.00	419*	\$2,000.00	740-46 ea.	\$21.00	887*	\$20.00	987*	\$10.00
135*	\$1,750.00	219*	\$2,000.00	420*	\$2,000.00	740-47 ea.	\$21.00	888*	\$20.00	988*	\$10.00
135*	\$1,750.00	220*	\$2,000.00	421*	\$2,000.00	740-48 ea.	\$21.00	889*	\$20.00	989*	\$10.00
135*	\$1,750.00	221*	\$2,000.00	422*	\$2,000.00	740-49 ea.	\$21.00	890*	\$20.00	990*	\$10.00
135*	\$1,750.00	222*	\$2,000.00	423*	\$2,000.00	740-50 ea.	\$21.00	891*	\$20.00	991*	\$10.00
135*	\$1,750.00	223*	\$2,000.00	424*	\$2,000.00	740-51 ea.	\$21.00	892*	\$20.00	992*	\$10.00
135*	\$1,750.00	224*	\$2,000.00	425*	\$2,000.00	740-52 ea.	\$21.00	893*	\$20.00	993*	\$10.00
135*	\$1,750.00	225*	\$2,000.00	426*	\$2,000.00	740-53 ea.	\$21.00	894*	\$20.00	994*	\$10.00
135*	\$1,750.00	226*	\$2,000.00	427*	\$2,000.00	740-54 ea.	\$21.00	895*	\$20.00	995*	\$10.00
135*	\$1,750.00	227*	\$2,000.00	428*	\$2,000.00	740-55 ea.	\$21.00	896*	\$20.00	996*	\$10.00
135*	\$1,750.00	228*	\$2,000.00	429*	\$2,000.00	740-56 ea.	\$21.00	897*	\$20.00	997*	\$10.00
135*	\$1,750.00	229*	\$2,000.00	430*	\$2,000.00	740-57 ea.	\$21.00	898*	\$20.00	998*	\$10.00
135*	\$1,750.00	230*	\$2,000.00	431*	\$2,000.00	740-58 ea.	\$21.00	899*	\$20.00	999*	\$10.00
135*	\$1,750.00	231*	\$2,000.00	432*	\$2,000.00	740-59 ea.	\$21.00	900*	\$20.00	1000*	\$10.00

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The Book:

Collecting Third Reich Philatelic Material- A Systematic Review

By Christopher Kolker MD

While I don't want to toot my own horn, I do want to bring to your attention the fact that I have written a book about Third Reich philatelic material. In this book, I explore its major categories, using the Michel catalog as a general guide to showcase interesting pieces from the Third Reich. I purposely made this book very bright and colorful, filled with pictures and descriptions. I make a great effort to explain the pictures, so that the reader understands what collectors look for. Philately is a visual hobby, and therefore, highlighting and emphasizing what we see in Third Reich philatelic material is crucial.

I wrote this book to engage as many readers and collectors as possible. I hope that beginners can understand what I've written and use it as a base to jumpstart their collection. The intermediate collector should find both the structure and the details educational, further enhancing their enjoyment of World War II philatelic material. Even experts will find a wealth of new information, as I sought to uncover the unusual and rare to keep even the most advanced readers engaged.

I do this because I believe we are at a crossroads in philately. At times, we struggle to find new collectors and younger philatelists. By engaging these stamp collectors, who are accustomed to the visual stimulation that technology provides, I felt that writing a highly detailed, technical book focused on near-trivial details would serve no purpose. Instead, this book aims to be bright, informative, and concise, much like the material we see on our cell phones today.

Still, I hope it provides you with both a great deal of education and pleasure.

It's available on Amazon, searchable by both title and author. I humbly ask that you purchase a copy to show your support for the work I have poured into this and to support fellow philatelists in their endeavors.

The following three pages are just some sample pages of what you can find in the book. Enjoy!



Taken from Germanstamps.net, the forgeries on bottom are easy to spot due to the different paper and color (and size). Dropped over Germany and Austria during Operation Cornflakes by the Allies in 1944, these stamps and their letters contained subversive material designed to destabilize the Nazi regime.

Operation Cornflakes went a step further to let people know that the Nazi postal system had been infiltrated. This grotesque Hitler caricature portrayed Hitler synonymous with death.





WER EIN VOLK RETTEN WILL
KANN NUR HEROISCH DENKEN

Germany printed the above commemorative sheet in 1937 for Hitler's 48th birthday. The below, printed by the American OSS (precursor to today's CIA), characterizes Hitler as death.



WER EIN VOLK RETTEN WILL
KANN NUR HEROISCH DENKEN

The caption listed below translate loosely as "Whoever wants to save a people can only think heroically"



The complete set of 8 special cancellations made for Hitler's 50th birthday is considered to be technically the finest made during this era.

The Berlin cancellation on Hitler's birthday stamp



AuctionWatch

Some good news: it is a buyer's market. The bad news: if you want to sell your collections, I haven't seen prices this low in quite some time. Get some value now, but don't sell low!

Cherrystone Auctions:



GERMANY Semi-Postals (B68) 1935 Ostrope souvenir sheet of four, canceled 24.6.35, intact perforations and watermark, sound and fine-v.f., cat. Value \$700 NO BIDS



GERMANY Semi-Postals (B79-89) 1935-36 Winter and Summer Olympics, sheet margin blocks of four, stamps n.h., fine-v.f., cat. Value \$620



GERMANY Air Post (C43-45) 1933 Chicago Flight, 1m-4m set of three, n.h., post office fresh, v.f., cat. Value \$3250 SOLD for \$700



GERMANY Air Post (C35-45) 1928-33 Zeppelin Issues complete, 11 different, fine to very fine, catalog value \$2202 SOLD for \$350.00

Daniel Kelleher Auctions



1935 Costumes complete (Scott B69-B78), set of 10, o.g., never hinged, Very Fine. Michel 588-597. Scott \$135.. SOLD for \$21.



Airmail, 1934, 3m Zeppelin (Scott C56), single, Very Fine. Michel 539x. Scott \$43. SOLD for \$12

Dr. Reinhard Fischer



20 to 100 Franc Wallonian legion, donations vignettes, in each case from upper margin on army postal service letter with a set to Antwerpen, cancelled by mute single circle army postal service standard stamp 28.11.42 and official seal repulse of the army postal service number 38918 A the feldpost number the SS-brigade lieutenant Wallonia, rare in this form to get, very fine, expertized Tust, certificate Wolfgang H. Tust BPP (1988), Michel 300.- SOLD for €130.00



Danish (Denmark) Legion of WWII. plus 25 ore to plus 1 crown views 1944, complete set to three values, mint never hinged, very fine, unsigned, photo expertized Gerhard Krischke \the condition is perfect. \, Michel 1.200.

SOLD for €360.00



Occupied Estonia (WWII) 30 K imperforated, perfectly mint never hinged from left margin, abridged certificate Nagler VP \genuine, perfect\, Michel 150




50 C. chamber of commerce stamp, about French postal stamps for the 6 Fr. postage supplemented mixed franking on local registered cover from \La Baule 7.5.45\ with arrival postmark on the back from 8.05.1945, expertise Lothar Herbst VP (2025) \the condition is perfect. rare ensemble with use a day before end of the war and arrival at the ceasefire
 SOLD for €200.00

Phoenix Auctions

(In Australian Dollars, \$1 Australian dollar equals approximately 0.70 US dollars)




1938 International Motor Show Set - (Cat £130) SOLD for AU\$80.00



1943 use of Feldpost lettersheet, canceled with double-circle 'SULZBERG/15VI43/b', to FP L-13591, UNSOLD even at AU\$10

Editor's Note – Their German stuff does not seem to sell well, so this may be an auction house to pick up some bargains!



1941 use of stampless cover, cancelled with void '17.2.41.3-4N' (B1), from FPO L03171 (Eastern France or Belgium - part of bombing campaign against England), FPO L03171 handstamp in BLC UNSOLD at AU\$10

R. Maresch & Son-

(In Canadian Dollars. 1 Canadian dollar = approximately \$0.73 American dollars)



1933 **NOTHILFE** souvenir sheet, 208x148mm, no gum, very fine. (Mi. BL2-€1500) Cat. Val. 1150.00 - SOLD for C\$230.00



1933 **NOTHILFE** souvenir sheet, (199x145mm) slightly trimmed, tied to a large part of the envelope, Wellendorf (Kr. Osnabrück) 21.5.36 cancels. (Mi. BL2- €7500) (*Editor's note: The presence of this souvenir sheet on actual mail increases the value by a factor of 5, but it only sold for double the value.*) SOLD for C\$270.00



1935 **OSTROPA** souvenir sheet (148 x 104 mm), with Special KÖNIGSBERG (PR) OSTROPA First Day cancel, very fine. (Mi. BL3 €1100) Cat. Val. 825.00 - SOLD for C\$180.00



1943 **THERESIENSTADT** CONCENTRATION CAMP parcel stamp used, very fine. (Mi 1 - €500) SOLD for C\$65.00

THÜRINGEN-SPENDE ZUR FRIEDENSWEIHNACHT 1945



PREIS 10 REICHSMARK
WOVON 0,50 RM. DER SOZIALEN WOHLFAHRT
DES LANDES THÜRINGEN ZUFLIEßEN

O. B. 826

(Editor's note: Technically, this one is in late 1945, months after the war, but I rarely see this valuable souvenir sheet come up for auction)

1945 Christmas souvenir sheet (121X120), Plate III, creases in left margin, pencil notation on back, nh. (Mi BI 2 - €2300)

SOLD for C\$190.00

DANZIG REPORT



STUDY and RESEARCH GROUP

Editor: John H. Bloecher Jr., 1743 Little Creek Drive, Baltimore, Md. 21207

Vol. 1 No. 12
Nov/Dec. 1976

1 NEWS



56Uu?

BRIEFWECHSEL:

Gene Marshall, from Shreveport, La., sends copies of an article on the "The Province of Prussia" which appeared in the 1854 issue of The Home Encyclopedia. This interesting history of Danzig and its surrounding neighbors will be reprinted as soon as we finish our postal history series.

From Clinton, N.Y., Herb Sears has sent a copy of his version of Mi. 56Uu which has been submitted to GPSY. This mint copy has a straight bottom edge, but the top appears to be severed by a more primitive means. Keep us informed of the outcome, Herb. Any other strange Mi. 56's out there?

We had a pleasant discussion with GPS member Dick Nurnberg at COMPEX concerning the Germania overprints of 1920, with their various perforations. There is a strong interest in Early Empire studies, but no one seems to have the time to start a study group for this area. Essential to many of us would be a translation of the Michel section which covers this time span.

Two excellent booklets by Curt Michaelis (in German) are "Flugpost von und nach Danzig", Part I (52 pages) and Part II (36 pages). These illustrated books carry a wealth of information on all important flights, Zepp post, Katapultflüge, inflation, Polish post offices in Danzig, etc. The pair may be ordered from INDI, P.O. Box 41268, Indianapolis, Ind. 46241, for \$9.50 postpaid. The type is clear and translation for even beginners appears to be easy.

A note was received from Dave Mocabee of Stanton, California, with the following auction item:

*** Mi. MH6b 1936 Complete booklet w/ stamps on yellowish paper, extremely scarce and way underpriced F-VF NH. Photo (Cat. value) DM5500.00 (Starting bid) \$1950.00

Needless to say, there were no takers.

Beginning on P. 3 is the first of the 1930 Ruberg article translated by Prof. Holger Homann of GPS Baltimore Chapter 16. Illustrations of covers supplied by Bud Hennig have been inserted at chronological

points within the article. We are grateful to Bud for his proof-reading and suggestions in this project. Additional postal history information from you readers will also be appreciated.

2 WAS IST ?

This issue was purposely delayed until the WAS IST? from Report No. 9 was properly answered. Several suggestions were received, but the winner appears to be Col. Harry Halle, the renowned GPS Sales Manager. Col. Halle says that the hand-stamped "20 P Einl. Geb." means "20 Pfennig Einliefern Gebühr" (literally: Deliver in, prepaid), and represents the 20 Pfg. that the rural mailman collected at the sender's door in order to have the postman register the cover at the district's post office. In return for the letter and fee, the postman handed the sender a temporary receipt, and, since 2 deliveries a day were normal, could often return the permanent receipt the same afternoon. All this information on special fees and purple hand stamps can be found in Paragraph XXV of the Postal Regulations of 30 November 1871. Thanks, Colonel.

Below is another example of the hand stamp, this one on a 1937 first day cover for the Leistungschau Block No. 3:



3

HISTORY OF DANZIG'S MAIL AND POSTAL CANCELLATIONS

In the beginning of the Middle Ages, there were no postal institutions run by the government. Itinerant monks and travelers occasionally carried consignments. Reigning princes, diets, officials and universities had messengers available. These were placed under a master of messengers, had to cover their routes in a certain time and were checked by means of timecards. They were forbidden to make detours for the purpose of carrying mail for private persons.

Danzig's messenger mail had its origin in the HANSA, whose far-flung mercantile interests required easier intercourse. The messengers, on horseback or on foot (runners), could be recognized by their insignia. They carried with them the documents of their appointment, and, in dangerous areas, were protected by letters of safe-conduct. The messengers did not receive a fixed income from the merchants employing them but rather postage fees. The main messenger routes were:

- (1) Hamburg - Lübeck - Danzig - Königsberg - Riga
- (2) Hamburg - Bremen - Amsterdam
- (3) Hamburg - Nuremberg
- (4) Nuremberg - Vienna - Stuttgart
- (5) Cologne - Holland - Augsburg - Nuremberg

Danzig's messenger went to Stettin in order to receive the mail coming from the other routes and to hand over his mail to the messengers of those routes. Riga's messenger carried out the transfer in Königsberg; Königsberg's messenger delivered in Danzig. In 1596 the City Council of Danzig took over the administration of the messenger service under the title: "Municipal Messenger Office". Danzig's first messenger ordinance was issued in 1604.

The journey from Danzig to Breslau was to be completed in 9 days from April 1 thru December 31, and in 11 days at all other times. The messenger received half of his fee at the time of departure and the rest when he returned. Danzig provided two messengers, as did Breslau. The master of messengers collected the letters, entered them into the register, calculated and accepted the postage, and determined any loss or embezzlement. A letter from Danzig to Thorn, Posen or Breslau cost 3 Groschen, a heavier one 6 Groschen and small packages correspondingly larger rates.

III.

Zum Dritten/ damit aber die jenigen so die Ordnung nicht mit halten/ wissen möchten/ was sie von ihren Brieffen zahlen sollen/ Als verordnet man von einem enkelen Brieffe/ einen halben bogē groß zwischen hier vnd Breslaw 3. groschen/ von einem ganzen bogen 6. grosch. Was aber grössere Brieffe so da in Coperten verbunden sein/ die sollen nach dem gewicht gezahlt werden/ vom Lothe zu .ge. Von solchen frömbden vnd andern Brieffen/ denen so nicht in der Ordnung sein/ sollen die jenige

The Messenger Ordinance, issued in 1622 by the Danzig City Council, established the size of a simple letter at one-half sheet; postage for 1 sheet was 6 Groschen per lot (10 grams). (Translator's note: the lot as a measure of weight can be anywhere from 50 to 10 gr.) Strangers paid an additional fee. The journey took 8 to 10 days. The municipal messenger master received 8 Groschen for each packet of letters.

Fig. 1: Section of 1622 Messenger Ordinance. For the entire publication, see Danzig Report No. 9.

The first mail traveled thru Germany in 1519 Franz von Taxis had been given the license without the princes' surrendering the mail privilege itself. On February 17, 1646, Danzig was connected to Riga via Königsberg.

In Prussia it was the "Grosse Kurfürst" who recognized the advantage of having a permanent postal institution and the importance of Danzig for such an institution connecting Cleve and Memel. The results of his negotiations with the Danzig municipal master of messengers were (a) a twice weekly pony express, Königsberg - Danzig, and (b) the swearing in of the Danzig postillions for Danzig and for the electoral service as well.

In 1649, the state took over the running and administrating of the postal service. The journey via Berlin was shortened by 24 hours. There was no lack of disputes with Danzig. Poland, too, involved herself in these at Danzig's request.

By means of a contract with Danzig, postage in 1654 was $7\frac{1}{2}$ Groschen for 100 ducats from Danzig to Memel; to Königsberg it was $3\frac{1}{2}$ Groschen; to Hamburg 20 Groschen. As it was for letters, postage for packages was levied according to decagrams (10 grams). The fare for people was 3 Groschen per mile plus a tip of 6 Groschen per station for the postillion. Occasionally, postage schedules were printed and posted together with postal reports in post offices and administrative offices for information. In 1660, the Danzig City Council demanded that the mail be carried all the way to the border. In the peace treaty of Oliva, a stipulation was attached (upon Polish insistence) to the surrender of the city of Elbing that the "Grosse Kurfürst" close his post office in Danzig; consequently, Brandenburg relocated her post office to Wutzkow.

The traveling speed of the mail was generally one mile per hour; the processing time was $\frac{1}{2}$ to $\frac{3}{4}$ of an hour. Postage for 10 grams from Danzig to Stettin was 3 Groschen.

In 1696, the Danzig postmaster, who had been installed by Poland, was engaged to intercede with his government that from then on Brandenburg's official mail should be carried thru Poland by electoral dragoons rather than by Polish mail. At the same time, it was demanded




Fig. 2: Earliest known Danzig letter; carried by ship captain, endorsed "p(er) mare", Danzig to London April 30, 1650.

that the mail to Königsberg should not depart before the mail from Berlin arrived. Assurance was obtained that at night, when the city gates were closed, the mail pouches were to be pulled across the moat and over the city walls by means of ropes.

In 1713, by order of the King of Poland, the director of the Prussian post office was dismissed. The continued disputes caused King Frederik to sell his post office in Danzig for 10,000 guilders and to cease operations of the Brandenburg post office in Danzig.

Around 1715, the first mail carriers (mailmen) appeared, at first as private servants of the post masters.

For the purpose of levying the delivery fee, Danzig was divided into 3 districts:

- (1) Hundegasse to Langgasse
- (2) the rest of the Rechtsstadt, Langarten , Niederstadt
- (3) the suburbs

A money letter of low value was 1, 2, or 3 Groschen respectively. Letters of more than 500 ducats cost 6 and 9 Groschen.

On August 10, 1712, the General Postal Regulation appeared in Prussia which did away with the different weights and measures of the various territories and imperial cities and instituted a uniform rate schedule.

Saxony, Hesse and Münster attempted to compete with the Prussian mail by instituting a pony express from Amsterdam via Münster, Kassel, Leipzig, Sorau, Warsaw to Danzig and Petersburg. However, Prussia learned about this in time so that this goal was not achieved, in spite of the fact that letters arriving in Danzig by Prussian mail were opened. In 1732, the Polish War of Succession brought about a disruption of operations thry the seige of Danzig. A superior force of cossacks forced the mail coach to turn around at Langfuhr. At headquarters, all letter pouches, with the exception of the Danzig letters, were opened, and those addressed to Prussia were added to the pouches intact.



Fig. 3: Danzig to Bordeaux, August 18, 1759. Private forwarder, Christian Sprengel, Amsterdam August 27, 1759. French entry mark: "D'HOLLANDE"

In 1723, the General Postal Service became a separate office, a division of the finance department and was under the authority of the General Superior Directory.




Fig. 4: Danzig to Bordeaux, March 27, 1765. Privately forwarded without his notation to Amsterdam. French entry mark: "D'HOLLANDE"




Fig. 5: Danzig to Bordeaux, June 15, 1765. Prussian State Post. Endorsement: "Fr(anco) Amsterd(am)", postally altered to "Weesel" in red. French entry mark: "MASEYCK"

In 1769, the office of Polish General Postmaster in Danzig came to an end. Warsaw employed in his stead four officials whose greed and arbitrariness surpassed everything that came before. For that reason, the Danzig merchants made very frequent use of the neighboring Prussian postal service. Thus the revenue of the Polish post office in Danzig decreased to such an extent that it no longer covered the salary expenses.

On October 1, 1772, the first Prussian mail coaches rolled toward the post offices that were newly established in all larger places. Establishing these post offices cost 70,000 Taler; in addition, 600 horses were acquired. The Prussian state took over those postal stations where there were no transport contractors. When necessary, the administration erected barns and office facilities. On October 3, 1772, the franking privilege was introduced for letters, for packages up to 40 pounds, for consignments of gold, silver, money and jewelry. Consignments for Danzig went to the new Prussian main post office in Stolzenberg which served to constrict the Polish post office in Danzig. Since Poland levied 12 Groschen for each letter mailed, more and more citizens of Danzig used this post office.

On April 9, 1793, the Prussian main post office was moved from Stolzenberg into the facilities of the desolved Polish post office in Danzig.

When the purchasing power of money declined due to the Seven-Years War, the fees were increased: for packages and money orders by 100%; the fare for people by one Groschen per mile (from 3 to 4), the tip for the postillion by 2 Gr. per stage station (from 6 Gr).

From 1741 to 1786, the Prussian mail yielded a surplus of 20 million.

In 1772, the old rate was reintroduced and remained in force to 1801.

In 1803, the system of having the postmaster share in the fees was abolished. Instead, a fixed salary was paid.

Because wheat prices went up, fees were raised temporarily by 50% from 1805 to 1811.

On October 7, 1806, Napoleon issued an order of the day that placed all postmasters in all of Germany under his protection. Whereas in Prussia the post offices were plundered over and over again by the French, Danzig was successful in preserving the Prussian post office. However, it was isolated from Berlin in 1806 and later suffered much from the siege and from French postal espionage. Only while they were on the job were the postal clerks under Prussian authority; at all other times they were considered citizens of Danzig. After the French retreat from Russia, postal service was impossible so that in the night of May 24, 1813 at 3 A.M., personnel and movable postal equipment were brought to the investing army by means of Oder boats. Danzig was liberated January 2nd when Prussian troops entered the city. Danzig had yielded the mail privilege to Prussia in 1810 for a consideration of 3,000 Taler per annum.

(Continued next issue)

DANZIG REPORT



STUDY and RESEARCH GROUP

Editor: John H. Bloecher Jr., 1743 Little Creek Drive, Baltimore, Md. 21207

Vol. 1 No. 13
Jan., Feb.,
March 1977

1 NEWS



Continuing in this issue is the Ruberg article on Danzig's postal history. Augmenting the original are many historic covers from Bud Hennig's collection as well as some added historic data on the Napoleonic siege of Danzig.

A correction on the Was Ist? article from that issue is in order. The Editor misinterpreted the hand-stamped slogan "20 P Einl.-Geb", which should be "20 Pfennig Einlieferungsschein Gebühr". Although our explanation of the meaning (fee paid to mailman to register a letter at the post office for the sender) has been challenged, we are sticking to this explanation until other proof is offered. Reason: the Postal Regulations of 1871 were still valid during the Free City era and we have found no superceding of this regulation as yet. This is not to say that none have been printed by the postal authorities, but we would like chapter and verse before changing our stand. Our authority (the 1871 book) is one of 11 known to exist today. If this directive was superceded, you will be the first to know, with our apologies.

The booklets of Report No. 11 have stirred more interest, even though the scarcity of material eliminates most of us from that phase of collecting. Ken Kloss has sent more information that should interest us all:

"Many of the world's booklets are great rarities: Estonia issued a booklet, of which only two copies are known today. Examples from Colombia and Trinidad, unlisted in any reference, were discovered recently, and a few British Colonial rarities are known today only in the form of specimen copies from the printers' archives, although they were undoubtedly issued and sold.

At one time there was an active club here in the States that specialized in booklets; it died out around 1960 but for some time published a little magazine called "The Booklet." I have a complete run of the magazine and have constructed a fairly complete index. From this I found only two references to Danzig booklets:

a) In Vol. III No. 12, p. 7 (June '56) there is a reprint from Janet van den Berg's column in Linn's Weekly:

"Got the Danzig booklets issued in 1933 and 1934? They cost only a few cents each when issued but they've turned out to be mighty scarce and are currently bring-

VOTE... See the May Specialist. Your one vote counts BIG!

ing up to \$20 retail on the world market."
(...obviously, not enough of us heeded this sound investment advice!)

b) In Vol. III, No.2, p. 2 (October '54), I found a more interesting tidbit. It seems that a Joseph Goldberger, of Melbourne, Australia, joined the Booklet Society this month and the Editor says:

"Our new member, Mr. Goldberger, was a stamp dealer in Danzig in the days before 1938. He had advertised in booklets of the 1933-34 issues and is now interested in buying these booklets with his ad in them. Mr. Goldberger, who is still a stamp dealer, has offered to supply our members with current booklets of Australia..."

You will note that Goldberger's ad is shown at the top of page 3 of your Report. Presumably he emigrated from Danzig as the political situation worsened and wound up in Australia. Unfortunately, I can't find his name on any recent address lists, so quite possibly he's no longer around.

One other bit of information: The Rogers catalog lists two Danzig booklets. The more confusing one is said to contain 1 each of panes 170b, 173b and 176b. The issue date is cited as 1925, and two subvarieties are listed:

- "a. Cover: Black on brown, marked 2
- b. Cover: Black on pink, marked 3"

It's hard to determine which of the Michel listings these could be. The edition numbers are not at all like those listed."

Many thanks to Ken Kloss for the above valuable information.

+++++

An update on our Zepp Addendum from Report No. 8, p. 2, has been received from Dr. Werner Bohne. This concerned a pair of Mi. 206II and 206's on Roy Dodd's 1929 Weltrundfahrt cover in which the #206 had a break in the left vertical frame, 2 mm from the top. The position was known to be at 42, and Werner reports that this "error" does not show up in his complete sheets nor in Schüler's. Both agree that it isn't an error but what might be called a "Druck-zufälligkeit." (A drop-out in printing rather than an error due to plate damage.)

A second update by Dr. Bohne concerns the long-running inquest into the Was Ist cover in our first Report. As you may recall, two different cancels were used on this cover. Werner reports that one of the cancels (Danzig a 1 f) was back-dated and will appear in the GPS Manual of Forgeries in release No. 9. Needless to say, the Manual is an absolute must for every German collector, and much money can be saved by identifying the weeds before purchasing!

+++++

Try to go to ROMPEX in Denver on May 20-22!

2

HISTORY OF DANZIG'S MAIL AND POSTAL CANCELLATIONS (Continued from Report #12)

Fig. 6: Republic of Danzig,
French Military Post.
Letter from a soldier
standing before Danzig.
"PREMIER CORPS/
GRANDE-ARMÉE/ No. 1"
Backstamped at Paris,
May 12, 1807.
"...depuis hier soir on
bombarde Dantzig, on
s'attend a une attaque
general..."
Letter is dated 15 April.




Fig. 7: May 21, 1807 (date of letter), was also the day of arrival of the 1st Division before Danzig. Backstamped at Paris, June 6, 1807.



The Treaties of Tilsit were agreements signed between Napoleon I and Tsar Alexander I upon a raft in the Niemen River and ended the war between France and Russia. They also extended the blockade of British trade to Russian ports, an act known as the Continental System, inaugurated by Napoleon I in his Berlin Decree of 21 November, 1806. The period of the Franco-Russian collaboration lasted until 31 December, 1810, when the Tsar reopened Russian ports to neutral shipping and imposed tariffs on French goods. The alliance ended with Napoleon's invasion of Russia on 24 June, 1812. This letter (Fig. 8) was written just before the signing of the Treaties of Tilsit on 8 July, 1807!





Fig. 8: Letter from soldier after leaving Danzig. "No. 9/ GRANDE-ARMEE". 1st Corps Headquarters at Tilsit, 20 June, 1807. "...depuis mon depart de Dantzic...le seconde jour de marche, 8 Juin..." Backstamped at Paris 11 July.

Fig. 9: Letter with "no. 59/ GRANDE-ARMEE" stamp.



TRIVIA

Admittedly, I am taking my foot off the accelerator that has become the Trivia column over the last few issues. Instead of beating you up, it's time to give you some reasonable questions, to show that you do know something. But watch out, a couple of these are sneaky-hard.

1. Who appointed Hitler Chancellor on January 30, 1933?

- A. Gustav Stresemann
- B. Paul von Hindenburg
- C. Otto Meissner
- D. Philipp Bouhler

2. The film 'Triumph of the Will', a Nazi propaganda film by Leni Riefenstahl, was filmed during the Nazi Party's 6th Party Rally. Which year was that?

- A. 1933
- B. 1934
- C. 1939
- D. 1926

3. Who was Adolf Hitler's boyhood friend, with whom he spent some time in Vienna?

A. Alois Hitler

B. August Kubizek

C. Lucas Katz

D. Herrman Goering

4. On January 20th, 1942, Eichmann, Heydrich, and several representatives from various branches of the Nazi government met for a secret meeting to plan what is known as the Final Solution, or the mass murder of the Jews of Europe. Where was this meeting held?

A. Wannsee

B. Munich

C. Potsdam

D. Duisburg

5. What methods were used by the Nazis to 'liquidate' Jews, communists, enemies of the state, etc.?

- A. Firing squads
- B. 'Gas Trucks'
- C. Zyklon B (poison gas)
- D. All these methods were used

6. On June 30 - July 2, 1934, there was a purge of the SA (Stormtroopers). Hitler himself took an active part in this event. What was this event called?

- A. Purge of the SA
- B. Nuremberg Laws
- C. Kristallnacht (Night of Broken Glass)
- D. Night of the Long Knives

7. Who was the leader of the Hitler Youth during the first few years of the Third Reich?

- A. Ernst Lammers
- B. Heinrich Himmler

C. Baldur von Schirach

D. Arthur Greiser

8. Who was in charge of the Four Year Plan?

A. Hermann Goering

B. Reinhard Heydrich

C. Josef Goebbels

D. August Grynzpan

9. In which city did the infamous Beerhall Putsch of 8-9 November 1923 take place?

A. Munich

B. Dresden

C. Berlin

D. Danzig

10. In which year did Hitler send troops into the Rhineland, which had been demilitarized under the Treaty of Versailles?

A. 1935

B. 1934

C. 1937

D. 1936

Trivia - Answers

1. Who appointed Hitler Chancellor on January 30, 1933?

The Correct Answer: Paul von Hindenburg

Paul von Hindenburg, a WWI hero and a figure of stability in 1933, personally disapproved of Hitler, and did not want to see him in power. Still, several factors led him to reluctantly grant Hitler the title of Chancellor:

- **Political Pressure:** Hindenburg faced pressure from conservative elites who believed they could control Hitler.
- **Popularity of the Nazis:** The Nazi Party had gained significant electoral support, making them a powerful political force.
- **Fear of Communism:** There was a widespread fear of communism, leading some to see Hitler as a bulwark against leftist movements.
- **Backroom Deals:** Political maneuvering and backroom deals among conservative politicians influenced Hindenburg's decision.
- **Misjudgment of Hitler:** Hindenburg underestimated Hitler's ambitions and believed he could be managed.
- **Desire for Stability:** Hindenburg sought to stabilize the government amid political chaos and thought Hitler could help achieve that.

2. The film 'Triumph of the Will', a Nazi propaganda film by Leni Riefenstahl, was filmed during the Nazi Party's 6th Party Rally. Which year was that?

The Correct Answer: 1934

"Triumph of the Will" is a propaganda film by Leni Riefenstahl aimed at glorifying the Nazi regime. Here are key points about the film:

- Released in 1935, it documents the 1934 Nuremberg Rally.
- It showcases Adolf Hitler and the Nazi Party's rise to power.
- The film employs innovative cinematography and editing techniques.
- Riefenstahl aimed to create a sense of unity and strength among Germans.
- It is often criticized for its manipulation of imagery and propaganda.
- Despite its artistic merit, it is associated with promoting fascism and totalitarianism.

After WWII, Leni Riefenstahl maintained that this film was 'pure art' and not propaganda.

3. Who was Adolf Hitler's boyhood friend, with whom he spent some time in Vienna?

The Correct Answer: August Kubizek

August Kubizek, born in 1888 in Linz, Austria, was the only surviving child of Czech and German parents. Kubizek and Hitler first met while competing for standing room in the Landestheater in Linz. Because of their shared passion for the operas of Richard Wagner, they quickly became close friends and later roommates in Vienna while both sought admission into college. The two shared a small room in Stumpergasse 31 in the sixth district of Vienna from 22 February to early July 1908.

However, Kubizek gained admission to the Vienna Conservatory, something that Hitler failed to do twice. This proved too much for Hitler, who abruptly ended the friendship and drifted towards homelessness. They lost touch. Kubizek had an illustrious career, both as a conductor and as a biographer of Mahler.

In 1955, he wrote the book, *The Young Hitler I Knew*, and passed away in 1956.

4. On January 20th, 1942, Eichmann, Heydrich, and several representatives from various branches of the Nazi government met for a secret meeting to plan what is known as the Final Solution, or the mass murder of the Jews of Europe. Where was this meeting held?

The Correct Answer: Wannsee

Originally scheduled for December 1941, but postponed because of Pearl Harbor, 15 high-ranking Nazi Party and German government officials gathered at a villa on January 15, 1942, in the Berlin suburb of Wannsee to discuss and coordinate the implementation of what they called the "Final Solution to the Jewish Question."

At the time of the Wannsee Conference, most participants were already aware that the Nazi regime had engaged in mass murder of Jews and other civilians in the German-occupied areas of the Soviet Union and in Serbia. Some had learned of the actions of the *Einsatzgruppen* and other police and military units, which were already slaughtering tens of thousands of Jews in the German-occupied Soviet Union. Others were aware that units of the German Army, the SS, and the police were killing Jews in Serbia. None of the officials present at the meeting objected to the "Final Solution" policy announced by Heydrich.

Heydrich indicated that approximately 11,000,000 Jews in Europe would fall under the provisions of the "Final Solution." In this figure, he included not only Jews residing in Axis-controlled Europe, but also the Jewish populations of the United Kingdom, and the neutral nations (Switzerland, Ireland, Sweden, Spain, Portugal, and European Turkey). For Jews residing in the Greater German Reich and holding the status of subjects of the German Reich, the Nuremberg Laws would serve as a basis for determining who a Jew was.

Heydrich announced that:

During the course of the Final Solution, the Jews will be deployed under appropriate supervision at a suitable form of labor deployment in the East. In large labor columns, separated by gender, able-bodied Jews will be brought to those regions to build roads, whereby a large number will doubtlessly be lost through natural reduction. Any final remnant that survives will doubtless consist of the elements most capable of resistance. They must be dealt with appropriately, since, representing the fruit of natural selection, they are to be regarded as the core of a new Jewish revival.

The participants discussed a number of other issues raised by the new policy, including the establishment of the Theresienstadt camp-ghetto as a destination for elderly Jews, as well as for Jews who were disabled or decorated in World War I; the deferment until after the war of “Final Solution” measures against Jews married to non-Jews or persons of mixed descent as defined by the Nuremberg laws; prospects for inducing Germany's Axis partners to give up their Jewish populations; and preparatory measures for the “evacuations.”

Despite the euphemisms that appeared in the protocols of the meeting, the aim of the Wannsee Conference was clear to its participants: to further the coordination of a policy aimed at the physical annihilation of the European Jews.

Taken from: <https://encyclopedia.ushmm.org/content/en/article/wannsee-conference-and-the-final-solution>

5. What methods were used by the Nazis to 'liquidate' Jews, communists, enemies of the state, etc.?

The Correct Answer: All these methods were used

This is so abhorrent that it is difficult to describe. Elie Wiesel's book, *Night*, may be the most influential book ever written, depicting Nazi atrocities firsthand.

6. On June 30 - July 2, 1934, there was a purge of the SA (Stormtroopers). Hitler himself took an active part in this event. What was this event called?

The Correct Answer: Night of the Long Knives

The Night of the Long Knives was a political purge carried out by Adolf Hitler and the Nazi leadership in Germany from June 30 to July 2, 1934. During this operation, Hitler ordered the killing or arrest of many perceived enemies within his own movement and beyond.

By 1934, Hitler had become the Chancellor but still needed full control. A major concern was the powerful Nazi paramilitary group, the Sturmabteilung (SA), led by Ernst Röhm. Röhm wanted the SA to replace the regular German army and push a more radical "second revolution."

This alarmed the German military leadership, conservative politicians, business elites, and Nazi leaders. Hitler decided to eliminate this threat to secure support from the army and consolidate power.

On the night of June 30, 1934, members of the Schutzstaffel (SS) and the Gestapo, both loyal to Hitler, arrested and executed SA leaders and other opponents.

Key victims included Ernst Röhm and Kurt von Schleicher, a former German chancellor. Estimates vary, but around 85–200 people were killed, and many more were arrested.

The purge destroyed the power of the SA and won the loyalty of the German army to Hitler. It showed that Hitler could use murder as a tool of state power without consequences. The SS was now the dominant Nazi internal force.

7. Who was the leader of the Hitler Youth during the Third Reich' reign?

The Correct Answer: Baldur von Schirach

The son of a German theatre director and an American mother, Schirach studied at the University of Munich. He joined the National Socialist Party in 1925 and was elected to the Reichstag in 1932. He was appointed *Reichsleiter* (Reich leader) in June 1933 and entered Adolf Hitler's inner circle. On June 18, 1933, Schirach was appointed youth leader of the German Reich (Jugendführer des Deutschen Reiches), a post he held until 1945, directing all Nazi youth organizations, including the Hitler Youth (Hitlerjugend). In August 1940 he was also appointed *Gauleiter* ("district leader") of Vienna.

Taken prisoner in 1945, Schirach was indicted on August 29, 1945, by the International Military Tribunal to stand trial for war crimes. During the trials, he admitted (May 23, 1946) that Hitler had given him the post of gauleiter for the express purpose of driving the Jews and Czechoslovaks out of Vienna. He also acknowledged that he had taken part in plans to ship Vienna's Jews to eastern areas. Schirach was found guilty of crimes against humanity and was sentenced on October 1, 1946, to 20 years' imprisonment. He was released from Spandau fortress in 1966. He died in 1974 in West Germany.

Taken from: <https://www.britannica.com/biography/Baldur-von-Schirach>

8. Who was in charge of the Four-Year Plan?

The Correct Answer: Hermann Goering

The **Four-Year Plan** was a major economic and military program launched by Adolf Hitler in 1936 in Nazi Germany. Its goal was to prepare Germany for war within four years by strengthening the economy and building up the military.

The plan had two central objectives:

1. **Rearmament** – Rapidly expand Germany’s military power in preparation for war.
2. **Autarky (economic self-sufficiency)** – Reduce Germany’s dependence on imported raw materials and food.

The Four-Year Plan involved several major economic measures:

- Massive military spending to build weapons, aircraft, and tanks.
- Development of synthetic substitutes for scarce materials (for example, synthetic rubber and fuel).
- Expansion of steel and coal production.
- Efforts to increase food production to reduce imports.

Born in Rosenheim, Germany, in 1893, Hermann Goering served in the German army during World War I and became a fighter pilot, earning numerous awards for his bravery in battle. After the war, he became involved in right-wing politics and eventually joined the Nazi Party in 1922.

In the years that followed, Hermann Goering played a key role in the growth of the Nazi Party and the consolidation of Hitler’s power in Germany. As a member of the Reichstag, he helped advance the Nazi agenda and was appointed Minister of the Interior in 1933. He was also instrumental in the establishment of the Gestapo, the secret police force that was used to suppress opposition to the Nazi regime.

Perhaps Hermann Goering’s most significant role was as Commander-in-Chief of the Luftwaffe, the German air force. He oversaw the development of new aircraft and played a key role in the early successes of the German

military in World War II, particularly in the Blitzkrieg campaign in Western Europe.

Despite his military success, however, Hermann Goering's personal life was plagued by addiction to morphine and other drugs. His addiction made him increasingly erratic and unreliable, and he was known to make poor decisions as a result.

As the war turned against Germany, Hermann Goering's power began to wane. In 1943, Hitler removed him from his position as Commander-in-Chief of the Luftwaffe, citing his failures in the war effort. Hermann Goering was increasingly marginalized in the Nazi government and was even placed under house arrest in 1945.

His trial and suicide at Nuremberg is the focus of the 2025 movie *Nuremberg*, which this author believes should have won the Academy Award for Best Actor.

Taken in part from: <https://www.historyonthenet.com/hermann-goering-the-rise-and-fall-of-a-nazi-leader>

9. In which city did the infamous Beerhall Putsch of 8-9 November 1923 take place?

Your Answer: Munich

The Beerhall Putsch was a failed coup attempt by Adolf Hitler and the Nazi Party in 1923, taking place in Munich, Germany, at the Bürgerbräukeller beer hall. Hitler aimed to overthrow the Weimar Republic and seize power, inspired by the political instability in Germany post-World War I. The putsch involved a march on the city center but was met with police resistance. Hitler was arrested and later tried for treason, gaining national attention. The attempted coup highlighted the growing influence of the Nazi Party in German politics and led to a shift in strategy for Hitler, focusing on legal means to gain power.

Hitler ended up in Landsberg prison, where he wrote 'Mein Kampf'. It also taught him that, to gain power, the National Socialists would have to reject an armed uprising and instead seek election.

10. In which year did Hitler send troops into the Rhineland, which had been demilitarized under the Treaty of Versailles?

The Correct Answer: 1936

The reoccupation of the Rhineland by German troops on March 7, 1936, marked a significant moment in the lead-up to World War II. Following the end of World War I, the Rhineland had been demilitarized under the Treaty of Versailles and the Locarno Treaties, with Allied forces, primarily French, occupying the region until 1930. Adolf Hitler's ascent to power in Germany led to a covert military buildup that ultimately transformed into an overt challenge to the post-war order. By capitalizing on tensions between Italy and France, Hitler determined that the moment was ripe for remilitarization, despite opposition from some military leaders who believed Germany was inadequately prepared for a conflict.

When German troops crossed into the Rhineland, they faced minimal resistance, as France was politically divided and hesitant to engage in another war so soon after the devastation of World War I. Prime Minister Sarraut supported a military response, but General Gamelin's cautious approach ultimately prevailed, leading to a lack of effective action. This bold move not only bolstered Hitler's domestic standing but also laid the groundwork for further aggressive expansion, significantly altering the balance of power in Europe and contributing to the atmosphere of instability that would culminate in global conflict. The reoccupation also had darker implications, as it initiated policies targeting individuals of mixed heritage in the region, reflecting the broader racial ideologies of the Nazi regime.

<https://www.ebsco.com/research-starters/history/german-troops-march-rhineland>

For Sale

We do have a few items for sale. They have recently been rebounded and redone. They look great and are definitely worth the price:

Mail Surveillance under the Third Reich by R.J. Houston. 35 pages. \$15.

German Feldpost Operations in the West 1940-1944 by John Painter. 2004. 60 total pages. \$20.

The War of the Springing Tiger by Jeffrey Markem is about Azad Hind stamps and the fight for India's Independence. \$10.

Composition Listing of Organic German Military Units, 1980. \$15.

Each of these is expertly written, filled with details that took scores of hours to research. All proceeds go only to the Third Reich Study Group. It is first-come, first-served, and if we get down to one copy, I will have more printed (but that could delay shipping by a week or so if it happens).

*Keep Calm and Keep
Collecting!*